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Abstract 
We study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political 
regimes. We document the following regularities. Natural resource windfalls have no effect 
on the political system when they occur in democracies. However, windfalls have significant 
political consequences in autocracies. In particular, when an autocratic country receives a 
positive shock to its flow of resource rents it responds by becoming even more autocratic. 
Furthermore,  there  is  heterogeneity  in  the  response  of  autocracies.  In  deeply  entrenched 
autocracies the effect of windfalls on politics is virtually nil, while in moderately entrenched 
autocracies windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. To 
frame the empirical work we present a simple model in which political incumbents choose 
the  degree  of  political  contestability  by  deciding  how  much  to  spend  on  vote-buying, 
bullying, or outright repression. Potential challengers decide whether or not to try to unseat 
the incumbent and replace him. The model uncovers a reason for the asymmetric impact of 
resource windfalls on democracies and autocracies, as well as the differential impact within 
autocratic regimes.  
 
Keywords:  natural resources, elections, political accountability 
JEL: D72, D78, Q33 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Macro Programme. The Centre for Economic 




We are very grateful to Antonio Ciccone for many discussions and to Tim Besley, Silvana 
Tenreyro,  and  seminar  participants  at  LSE  and  UPF  for  comments.  Caselli  gratefully 
acknowledges the support of CEP, and Banco de España, the latter through the Banco de 
España Professorship, and the hospitality of CREI, where the project was initiated.  
  Francesco  Caselli  is  Director  of  the  Macro  Programme,  Centre  for  Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics. He is also a Professor of Economics at the LSE.  
Andrea  Tesei  is  a  Graduate  Student  with  the  Department  of  Economics  and  Business, 





Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All  rights  reserved.  No  part  of  this  publication  may  be  reproduced,  stored  in  a  retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
 F. Caselli and A. Tesei, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
Looking at the historical experiences of specic countries it seems uncontroversial that an abundance
of natural resources can shape political outcomes. Few observers of Venezuela, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,
and many other resource-rich countries would take seriously the proposition that political developments in
these countries can be understood without reference { indeed without attributing a central role { to these
countries' natural wealth. Yet, the mechanisms through which natural-resource abundance aects politics
frustrate attempts to identify simple generalizations, with resource-rich countries displaying great variations
in measures of autocracy and democracy, and political stability. For example, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria
both feature a strong tendency towards autocracy but the former is extraordinarily stable while the latter
has experienced nine successful coups since independence (and many unsuccessful ones). Venezuela seems to
go back and forth between democracy and autocracy, with swings that closely follow the price of oil, while
of course Norway appears to be safely and stably democratic irrespective of the oil price.
In this paper we use a large panel of countries to document the following regularities. Natural resource
windfalls have no eect on the political system when they occur in democracies. However, windfalls have
signicant political consequences in autocracies. In particular, when an autocratic country receives a positive
shock to its ow of resource rents it responds by becoming even more autocratic. Importantly, there is het-
erogeneity in the response of autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies the eect of windfalls on politics
is virtually nil. It is only in moderately entrenched autocracies that windfalls exacerbate the autocratic
nature of the political system. Hence, our evidence generalizes casual observation: windfalls have little or
no impact in democracies (the Norways) or very stable autocracies (Saudi Arabia), but change the political
equilibrium in more unstable autocracies (Nigeria, Venezuela).
To reach these conclusions we measure natural-resource windfalls as changes in the price of a country's
principal export commodity. We argue that such changes are exogenous to a country's political system.1
While total resource exports may depend on political developments, the identity of a country's main export
commodity (e.g. oil v. gold) is unlikely to depend on politics. Similarly, the vast majority of countries
individually account for a relatively small share of world output in their principal export commodity, so
it is unlikely that political changes there will have an important eect on prices. Our main measure of
political institutions is from the Polity IV database. Crucially for our analysis this is a continuous measure
that varies from extreme autocracy to perfect democracy, so it allows us to condition the analysis on infra-
marginal dierences in the degree of autocracy/democracy, as well as to capture the eects of windfalls on
infra-marginal changes in autocracy/democracy. As this variable captures the extent to which the political
system is open to competition, we sometimes refer to our measure of autocracy/democracy as a measure of
\political contestability."
In order to motivate our empirical analysis, and facilitate the interpretation of the results, we open the
paper with a simple model of endogenous determination of political contestability. In our model there is a
governing elite that has complete control of the ow of income from natural resources, and decides whether
and how much of it to invest in what we call \self-preservation activities." These range from the mild (e.g.
direct or indirect vote-buying) to the extreme (violent repression of the opposition). At the same time, a
political entrepreneur outside the ruling elite decides whether or not to challenge those in power and try to
1In the empirical analysis we address the issue of large producers with the potential to inuence world prices, and nd that
our results are not aected by these economies.
1replace them. This simple game generates endogenously two possible political \modes" : free and fair political
competition (recognizable as democracy), where the elite essentially allows challenges to occur on a relatively
level-playing eld, and the political entrepreneur chooses to compete for power; and a \repression" mode
where the elite invests some of the resources deriving from natural resources in self-preservation activities,
without however succeeding in completely deterring challenges.
In our basic model, the key determinant of the regime that is selected as an equilibrium is the amount of
revenue accruing to the government from natural resources. This enters the ruling elite's decision problem
in two ways: it is part of the payo from staying in oce, as political survival implies that the current elite
remains in control of future revenues; and it also enters the budget constraint, as it is the principal source of
funding for self-preservation activities, such as vote-buying or political repression. At low levels of resource
income, the incentive to engage in self-preservation spending is relatively low, as the future \pie" to hold
on to is small. Democracy is the outcome. At higher levels the future benets from holding on to power
are suciently large that the government shifts to autocracy. Crucially, the larger the pie, the more the
incumbent nds it optimal to spend on self-preservation, so the degree of autocracy is increasing in the size
of the resource rents.
One prediction of the model is that political contestability is non-linearly related to resource abundance.
Resource-poor countries will be democratic, while resource-rich ones will be autocratic, and the level of
autocracy will be increasing in the amount of resource rents. We show that this simple cross-country relation
is consistent with the data, when resource abundance is measured in terms of commodity exports. However
for reasons we discuss later this is not a compelling test. We therefore note that another prediction of the
model is that resource-poor countries (democracies) will not experience changes in political contestability
following (small) resource shocks, while resource-abundant countries will. Furthermore, in the model, the
rate of decline in political contestability following changes in resource rents is decreasing in the initial level
of resource rents (and hence in the initial level of autocracy). This is due to an assumption of decreasing
returns in self-preservation spending by the incumbent government. Hence, the model also predicts that in
autocracies the eect of windfalls is decreasing in the extent to which the autocracy is entrenched. This
predicted heterogeneity in response between democracies and autocracies, as well as within autocracies, is
the focus of our empirical work.
The threshold levels of resource income that cause the shift from one political regime to the other depend
on parameters that may vary across countries. In a very simple extension to our basic model, in particular,
the thresholds depend on a parameter that could be interpreted as the return oered by the markets on the
human capital of defeated politicians. If former politicians can look forward to decent returns on their talent
in the market, the range of values of natural wealth for which the ruling elite accepts free and fair challenges
is (potentially much) wider than in places where politics is the only road to riches. In this way, the model
can potentially also explain cases, such as Norway, where great natural-resource wealth is associated with
democracy.
The paper continues as follows. In the next subsection we briey review the relevant literature. Section
2 presents the model and Section 3 presents data and results. Section 4 concludes.
21.1 Related Literature
An important literature in political science studies the relationship between resource abundance and
democratic/autocratic institutions using predominantly comparative case studies or cross-country varia-
tion [e.g. Ross (2001a, 2001b, 2009), Ulfelder (2007), Collier and Hoeer (2009), Alexeev and Conrad
(2009) and Tsui (2010)]. While there is some heterogeneity in the conclusions this literature tends to reach,
the evidence in these studies points to a negative relationship between resource abundance and democ-
racy/democratization, consistent both with our model and the circumstantial cross-sectional evidence we
also present below. However, we argue that identication of causal eects can be achieved with greater
condence using within-country variation, and this is the basis for the core of our empirical evidence.
A recent literature narrowly focused on windfalls from oil uses within-country evidence. Haber and
Menaldo (2010) and Wacziarg (2009) nd no evidence that oil windfalls lead to greater autocracy. One
concern with the Haber and Menaldo (2010) study is that its measure of oil revenue, partly based on
oil production, is potentially endogenous to democratic change, while a possible concern with Wacziarg's
analysis is that it uses the world oil price for all countries, meaning that there is no possibility to control for
correlated time eects across countries. Br uckner, Ciccone, and Tesei (2011) nd a positive coecient on
oil-price shocks interacted with the share of net oil exports in GDP in a regression for movements towards
democracy. They do not condition on whether the country is initially a democracy or an autocracy, nor do
they examine heterogeneous responses within autocracies.2
On the theoretical front, Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) present a model of autocratic rule
where, as in our model, natural-resource rents aects both the value of holding power and the resources
available to the incumbent to protect himself. In many ways our model is a much simplied version of
theirs. However, they focus on a dichotomous outcome (democracy v. autocracy) so their analysis has no
predictions on how the eect of windfalls will vary within autocracies. Also, in their framework democracies
are absorbing states by construction, whereas we derive this endogenously. Finally, somewhat more subtly, in
their framework the main results are derived as a consequence of resource windfalls relaxing the kleptocrat
budget constraint, whereas in our model the main mechanism is the variation in the value of staying in
power. Haggard and Kaufman (1997) and Geddes (1999) also stress the role of the budget constraint of
political incumbents.
Still fairly closely related are studies of how economic changes other than resource windfalls aect democ-
racy/autocracy, and how resource windfalls aect political outcomes other than democracy/autocracy.
Prominent in the rst vein is the long tradition, stretching back at least to Lipset (1959) of studies linking
changes in incomes to changes in political institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2006) develop models
in which temporarily low income lowers the opportunity cost of challengers to the status quo, leading to
democratic transitions in autocracies and reversals in democracy. Our model diers in that the eect of
income changes depends not only on whether the political system is initially autocratic or democratic, but
also on infra-marginal heterogeneity in the degree of initial autocracy. Furthermore, to make the model
speak more directly to the eects of commodity booms we model the economic mechanism not as a change
in the opportunity cost of challengers but as a change in the reward of holding political power. Furthermore,
2A possible interpretation of the result in Br uckner, Ciccone, and Tesei (2011) is that, since the oil share is highly correlated
with autocracy, their oil-share/oil-price interaction operates as a rough proxi for our autocracy/oil-price interaction. The results
are therefore consistent, as in both cases they imply a lesser movement towards autocracy in more entrenched autocracies.
3we model changes in political regime not as a dichotomous transitions towards democracy but as continuous
changes in the degree to which the regime represses political contestability. Because of these dierences,
our predictions also dier markedly, as we predict no response in democracies and infra-marginal changes in
autocracies.
Many authors have investigated empirically the causal relationship between income and democracy [e.g.
Barro (1999), Epstein et al. (2006), Ulfelder and Lustik (2007), Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007),
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008), Br uckner and Ciccone (2009), and Burke and Leigh
(2010).] As discussed, we focus not on generic income changes but more specically on windfalls associated
with commodity price shocks. Because natural-resource booms typically translate into direct windfalls into
the hands of political elites these shocks may have very dierent political consequences than other sources of
income shocks. In fact, the literature on the natural resource curse casts doubt on the premise that resource
windfalls are aggregate-income increasing [e.g. Sachs and Warner (2001)]. Burke and Leigh (2010) do use
commodity price changes as instruments for income changes, so their work is more closely related. They
nd insignicant eects of commodity-driven income changes on political regimes. Their focus, however, is
on dichotomous variables measuring the onset of large changes towards autocracy or democracy. Instead,
in keeping with the spirit of our model, we study changes in autocracy/democracy as a continuous variable.
Furthermore, Burke and Leigh do not condition the eect of commodity price changes on whether the country
was initially democratic or autocratic, much less on infra-marginal dierences in the initial level of political
contestability. Finally, as already mentioned, in Burke and Leigh the eect of windfalls is mediated by their
eect on income changes, while we estimate the direct eect of the windfall. For the reasons mentioned
above there may be reasons to prefer a reduced-form specication.
As for the literature studying the eects of resource windfalls on political outcomes other than democ-
racy/autocracy, a very incomplete list includes the theoretical studies of Tornell and Lane (1998), Baland
and Francois (2000), and Torvik (2002), all of whom study theoretically the consequences of windfalls for rent
seeking, and Leite and Weidmann (1999), Tavares (2003), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Dalgaard
and Olsson (2008) and Caselli and Michaels (2011) that present corresponding empirical evidence (where
rent seeking is usually measured though proxies of corruption). Caselli and Coleman (2006) examine theoret-
ically the consequences of resource abundance for ethnic conict, and Besley and Persson (2010) for political
violence.3 Cabrales and Hauk (2009) study the impact of resource windfalls on incumbents' probability of
re-election, though their main focus is on the consequences for human-capital accumulation.
2 Natural Resources and Political Outcomes
2.1 Model
The setting is a discrete-time innite-horizon economy which generates, in every period, a constant ow
of consumption goods A from the exploitation of natural resources. Interpretations of A include: the ow
of royalties and other fees paid to the government by international extracting companies for the right to
operate in the country; prots of state-owned corporations engaged in drilling and mining; rents generated
3The mechanism in Caselli and Coleman (2006) and Besley and Persson (2010) is similar to ours: scal windfalls increase the
value of holding power leading to grater incentives to engage in exploitation of others, repression and (for the non-incumbent
group), ght back. However, initial political institutions are taken as exogenous, while they are endogenous in our model.
4by the international distribution of domestic cash crops by state-controlled marketing boards; or other rents
linked to cash-crops exports due to discrepancies between ocial and market exchange rates. We will refer
to A as \resource rents."
The economy is populated by a very large number of innite-lived agents. In every period one agent,
which we term the \incumbent," has complete control of these ows, in the sense that he can decide how
to allocate them between dierent uses. One should think of the incumbent as the individual or group of
individuals who has de facto control of the government - and is hence in receipt of the resource rents. In a
democracy this would be the President and his collaborators (in presidential systems), or the leadership of
the governing parties (in parliamentary systems). In autocracies this would be the autocrat, his family, and
his close associates. Aside from the benets associated with control of the resource rent A, an incumbent
also receives a ow of \ego rents" . Assuming that there are additional benets (both psychological and
material) from holding political power is realistic and indeed standard in the literature.
In every period another agent (not the incumbent) is randomly selected by nature to be the \potential
challenger." The potential challenger is given an opportunity to try to replace the incumbent. In particular, if
the potential challenger decides to attempt to unseat the incumbent, the attempt will succeed with probability
p. p is endogenous as we discuss shortly. In a democracy the potential challenger could be interpreted as
the person with the best chance to win an electoral context against the incumbent president/party. In an
autocracy it could be the agent best placed to successfully lead a coup or a popular uprising against the
ruling clique. The assumption that in every period there is only one potential challenger is not important
for the results but simplies the analysis. For simplicity of presentation and again without loss of generality
we also assume that potential challengers are drawn without replacement (i.e. each agent gets at most one
chance to challenge) and that deposed incumbents never get a chance to challenge subsequent incumbents.
The potential challenger has an outside option represented by the present value of his activities outside
politics, which we denote .
As mentioned the incumbent must allocate the resource rent among possible uses. One use of the
resource rents is what we call \self-preservation." Self-preservation spending is any spending that reduces the
probability that a challenge succeeds (conditional on a challenge occurring). Hence, if Bt is self-preservation
spending, the probability of a successful challenge is p(Bt), with p0(Bt) < 0. Our interpretation of self-
preservation spending is as a catch-all for all activities the government engages in in order to subvert the
outcome of the political-selection process in his favor. It includes vote-buying and patronage spending, buying
and/or bullying and intimidation of the media, and outright repression and persecution of opponents. The
higher is B, the more aggressive and draconian the tactics employed. Hence, we think of variation in B
as capturing infra-marginal variation in the eorts exerted by those currently in power to subvert the rules
of the game in their favor, with greater values of B being associated with greater autocracy. By the same
token, we think of B = 0 as the situation where the incumbent accepts to be challenged on a \free and fair"
basis. In sum, we interpret countries with B = 0 as \democracy" and countries with B > 0 as displaying
varying levels of autocracy. Since B also aects a potential challenger's chances of taking over we will also
refer to B as a measure of political contestability.




 2 (0;1) and  > 0 are exogenous parameters. Hence, self-preservation spending is subject to
decreasing returns, with p(0) = 
 - implying that a challenger can never be absolutely certain of success -
and p(B) > 0 for all B - implying that an autocrat can never be absolutely sure of successfully withstanding
a challenge. These features are important but seem sensible.
The portion of A not spent on self-preservation is spent on another activity, which we call \consumption"
and denote by Ct. Ct provides a direct utility ow to the incumbent, so that his total utility ow in period
t is Ct + . Obviously one interpretation of Ct is resources appropriated by the incumbent and his clique
for personal enrichment - the infamous \Swiss bank accounts." But in general Ct could be interpreted as an
aggregate of all the spending that provides satisfaction to the incumbent and hence, possibly, it could include
public spending on schools, hospitals, etc., if the incumbent is partially altruistic or derives satisfaction from
doing a \good job."
The restrictive assumption is that the components of Ct do not aect p or . If the public is less
tolerant of corrupt politicians, then we might expect the components of Ct that represent self-enrichment
to enter p positively. If the public rewards competent politicians, we should expect the components of Ct
that represent public spending to enter p negatively, in the tradition of Barro (1973). In addition, public
spending in infrastructure, human capital, and other growth-promoting public goods could improve the
outside option of potential challengers by improving opportunities in the private economy (or increasing the
cost of recruiting supporters). Hence, these components of Ct could increase . We abstract from these
issues in order to get simple results, but see Caselli and Cunningham (2009) for a detailed discussion.4 We
are also implicitly assuming that there is no scope for government borrowing, though as we discuss below
this assumption could easily be replaced by an assumption that incumbents face an upward-sloping supply
curve for borrowing, without qualitative changes in the results.
The series of events within each period is the following. First the incumbent allocates the period rents
A between self-preservation Bt and consumption Ct. Next nature picks a potential challenger, and the
potential challenger decides whether or not to try to unseat the incumbent. If yes, then the challenge success
with probability p(Bt). If the challenge succeeds, the challenger becomes the new incumbent. If it fails,
the incumbent continues as incumbent, as he does if the challenger foregoes the opportunity to try. Time is
discounted by all agents at rate .
2.2 Analysis
We formally analyze the model in the Appendix. Here we oer a heuristic discussion and explain the key
results.
We focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), of which we show there is only one. Given that the only
state variable is the resource rent A, and this is constant over time, it is immediate that players will follow
4A straightforward extension in the direction of allowing productive public spending would be as follows. Rents are allocated
between repression, B, private consumption, C, and productive public spending, G, and the probability of successful challenge
is decreasing in both B and G: p(B) = 
e B G. It is immediate to show that in this case the incumbent never uses both
tools at the same time. In particular, if  >  the incumbent only uses repression, while if  <  he only uses productive public
spending. Hence, one interpretation of the model is that we focus on the case  > . Another interpretation is that the relative
magnitudes of  and  vary across countries, perhaps for cultural, geographic, or geostrategic reasons. In countries where  > 
the analysis in the rest of this section applies. Countries with  >  will obviously be democracies, as we dened democracy
as a country with B = 0. Furthermore, in such countries shocks to natural-resource rents will have no impact on B. Hence,
we recover the same empirical prediction as in the baseline model, namely that we should observe no systematic response of
political institutions to resource shocks in democracies.
6stationary strategies, namely the incumbent will set the same value of B in every period, while the potential
challenger will either always challenge or never challenge.
We begin by establishing the conditions for equilibria where the challenger always challenges. In such an
equilibrium, the value of being an incumbent at the beginning of any period is
V (A;B0) =
 + A   B0
1    [1   p(B0)]
;
where B0 is the equilibrium level of self-preservation spending. In every period the incumbent receives
ego rents  and consumes resource rents net of self-preservation spending A   B. This ow utility is
appropriately discounted by taking into account time preferences  and the fact that in each period the
probability of \political death" is p(B0). Note that for simplicity we have normalized the continuation value
after losing oce to 0.
One condition for an equilibrium with challenges is that the level of self-preservation spending must be
feasibly optimal from the point of view of the current incumbent. The current incumbent's problem is
max
B
f + A   B +  [1   p(B)]V (A;B0)g
s.t.:B  0
B  A
In choosing B the incumbent trades o the short-term decline in consumption with the improved probability
of surviving until next period and enjoying the continuation value of oce. The feasibility constraints say that
self-preservation spending cannot be negative and cannot exceed the resources available to the incumbent.
Now dene b(A;B0) as the solution to the above problem. In an equilibrium, b(A;B0) must be a xed
point, or
b(A;B0) = B0:
In the appendix we show that this xed-point problem has a unique solution. In particular, there exists
a value of A; A0, such that the solution is at the corner B0 = 0 for A  A0, while for A > A0 B0 is the
interior solution to the problem above. We call this interior solution B(A). B(A) is increasing, concave,
and satises B(A0) = 0. The intuition for this result is simple, and can be illustrated with reference to
the incumbent's problem above. The marginal cost of extra preservation spending is constant and equal to
1. The marginal return is  p0(B)V (A;B0), i.e. the improvement in survival probabilities times the value
of surviving. Since the value of surviving is increasing in A, there can be suciently low values of A such
that the incumbent renounces all self-preservation eorts. On the other hand, if A is suciently large, the
incumbent spends (increasing) amounts on self-preservation. The equilibrium amount of self-preservation is
the one that equalizes marginal cost and marginal benet.5
The threshold value A0 is given by
A0 =






5We show in the appendix that the other constraint, B  A, is never binding.
7and is therefore decreasing in the \ego rents" from holding oce. Intuitively, the larger the ego rents, the
less the level of resource rents required to make the incumbent feel that incumbency is valuable enough to
invest resources in protecting it. The technology of political replacement also aects A0. In particular, a
higher productivity of self-preservation spending, , makes the incumbent more willing to exert eorts in
this direction, lowering the threshold for autocratic behavior.
As mentioned above we think of B = 0 as akin to the idea of \free and fair" political competition, and
hence as democracy. Since democracy is the observed equilibrium outcome in many countries, we assume
that there exists a region of the parameter space where it occurs. Formally,
Parametric Assumption (PA) 1:
A0 > 0:
A second condition for an equilibrium where the challenger challenges is that challenging is optimal given
the level of self-preservation eorts exerted by the incumbent. If the equilibrium incumbent strategy is B,
the challenger decides to challenge if
p(B)V (A;B) > : (1)
The left hand side is the expected utility of challenging. This is equal to the time-discounted value of
beginning next period as the incumbent, times the probability that the challenge will succeed. Note that
we are implicitly assuming that the challenger experiences no ow utility in the period of the challenge
(conditional on a challenge occurring). This could easily be relaxed without any change in results. Also
note that for simplicity we normalize the value of a defeated challenger to 0. We discuss the implications
of relaxing this assumption below. The right hand side is the (certain) utility from not challenging, i.e. the
outside option .6
Since the value of holding oce is increasing in A, condition (1) is satised for A if it is satised for
A = 0. In turn, the condition is satised for A = 0 if the following parametric assumption holds.7




1   (1   
)
:
Note that for A = 0 the incumbent chooses democracy. If PA2 did not hold incumbents would face no
challenges in democracies. This would be counterfactual so PA2 seems like a plausible assumption. The
simple interpretation of PA2 is that the ego rents from oce are suciently attractive relative to private life
to make potential challengers willing to try their luck at politics (when there are no resource rents and the
country is a democracy).
A nal requirement for an equilibrium where the challenger challenges is that the incumbent does not try
to completely deter a challenge in the current period. The deviation that does so is the one that satises (1)
with equality. Call ~ Bc(A) such a deviation. We show that there exists a level of A, ~ A, such that ~ Bc(A) > A
for all A < ~ A. This says that \resource poor" incumbents cannot aord the level of preservation spending
that would be required to completely deter challenges. Only when A is suciently large can an incumbent
6Note that  depends on . In particular, if  is the ow utility in the private sector then  = =(1   ).
7To see that PA1 and PA2 are mutually consistent notice that PA1 can be rewritten as
















This is increasing in the ego rents. Larger ego rents mean that potential challengers are less easily deterred,
i.e. the required investments in self-preservation are larger, and therefore unaordable for a broader range
of values of A. Similarly, ~ A is decreasing in the opportunity cost of challenging and in the productivity of
spending.
For values of A  ~ A deviating to a strategy of complete deterrence is feasible, and the question is
whether the deviation is preferred. It turns out that this depends on whether log() + 1  0 { in which
case the deviation is preferred { or log() + 1 < 0, in which case the incumbent sticks to the \interior"
(non-deterring) amount of preservation spending. The intuition is that both  and  reduce the cost of full
deterrence, the former by increasing the productivity of preservation spending, and the latter by making the
challenger more easily convinced thanks to a better outside option.
For reasons to be discussed shortly, we assume that even when a deviation is feasible the incumbent will
not deviate from the \interior" strategy. Formally,
Parametric Assumption (PA) 3:
log() + 1 < 0:
This leads to the following summary of the discussion so far.
Lemma 1. Under PA2 and PA3 a MPE where the challenger challenges exists for all A: If A  A0 then
B = 0 (democracy). If A > A0 then B = B(A) (autocracy).
We can now turn to the conditions for a MPE where the challenger is deterred. In this equilibrium the
incumbent invests an amount ~ B(A) that solves
p( ~ B) ~ V (A; ~ B) = ;
where ~ V (A; ~ B) is now the value of incumbency when the challenger does not challenge. ~ B(A) is increasing
and concave. By denition of ~ B(A) the challenger is deterred. Not surprisingly it turns out that the policy
is feasible if A  ~ A, but it is preferred by the current incumbent to a one-period deviation to the optimal
\interior" level of B if PA 3 holds. Hence, we have the following result.
Lemma 2.Under PA3 there is no MPE where the challenger is deterred.
The reason for imposing PA3 are largely dictated by events in the Middle East and North-Africa of
early 2011. Even regimes that were the byword for stability and entrenchment have appeared unable to
discourage attempts to unseat them, irrespective of the large amounts of resources (from oil or from foreign
aid) available to their rulers. PA3 rules out the possibility of complete deterrence.8
Note that Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the MPE is unique. This gives rise to the following conclusion.
Conclusion. In the unique MPE equilibrium, resource poor countries are democracies, while resource
rich countries are autocracies. In autocracies, spending on self-preservation is an increasing and concave
function of the resource rents.
8If we were to replace PA2 with its opposite , and assumed A0  ~ A then we would have three types of political regimes:
democracies (B = 0 for A  A0); unstable autocracies (B = B for A0 < A  ~ A); and stable autocracies (B = ~ B for ~ A < A).
While this set of outcomes may have seemed anecdotally appealing until recently we think this is no longer the case.
9This result says that for values of the resource rent that are suciently small the value of staying in oce
is limited, and does not justify spending on self-preservation. Hence, resource poor countries will tend to be
democratic. For higher values of resource rents the incumbent nds it optimal to exert eorts to remain in
power, and does so up the point where the extra improvement in the expected value of staying in oce is
equal to the marginal cost of resources spent on self-preservation. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium amount
of self-preservation spending as a function of A.
To get us closer to our empirics we now consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that at
some date the value of A unexpectedly increases by a (small) amount dA, and all agents expect it to remain
constant at this value for the indenite future (this is all consistent with rational expectations if A is believed
to be a random walk). Then we obviously have
dB = 0 for A  A0
dB = B0 for A0 < A
Hence, in resource-poor countries marginal increases in resource rents lead to no political change. However, in
countries with non-negligible resource rents, further windfalls induce an increase in self-preservation spending.
In particular for intermediate values of the rent ow the incumbent becomes keener to stay in oce, and
hence increases his eorts in this direction. For even larger initial levels of the resource ow, the incumbent
nds that the required amount of spending needed to deter challengers goes up, and must correspondingly
increase it. Because B is a concave functions of A, the response of self-preservation spending is decreasing
in the resource ow over this range.
Combining the two sets of results on the level of B and the change of B as functions of the initial level of A,
it is also possible to recast the latter set of results as conditioned on the initial level of democracy/autocracy.
In particular, as we have noted, for low levels of A countries tend to be democratic. This implies that in
democracies, marginal changes in the ow of resource rents have no eect on the political equilibrium. For
larger values of the resource rent, countries are autocracies. Hence, we nd that in autocracies, marginal
changes in the ow of resource rents make the political equilibrium more autocratic. Furthermore, the degree
of tightening of the autocratic screws is variable. Clearly the concavity of B with respect to the initial
level of A also carries through to the relationship between the change and the initial level of B. Hence,
in autocracies, the increase in autocracy following an increase in resource revenues is diminishing in the
initial level of autocracy. For reasons we discuss below, the core empirical work in the paper is based on the
predictions of this paragraph.
To fully appreciate the potential for the model to map into real-world outcomes it is essential to note
that the threshold A0 depends on parameters that are potentially country-varying. For example, a decline
in the eectiveness of self-preservation spending  or in the ego rents  shift the autocracy threshold A0
to the right. In other words, countries with greater cultural, geographical, historical, or external resistance
to autocracy { all features that should map into a lower value of  { or countries where the same factors
dictate that the balance between the privileges and the responsibilities of political power weighs the latter
more (low ), will remain in democratic mode for a wider range of values of A. This way, the model can
perhaps be seen as consistent with cases of high A associated with free and fair democracy, such as Norway.
Possibly one limitation of the model above is that we impose a balanced-budget constraint. It should
be fairly obvious that the mechanism highlighted in the previous section will continue to work even if the
10government can tap into foreign nancial markets to nance self-preservation spending. All that is needed is
that the government faces an upward sloping supply curve of funds. relative to the model presented above,
the marginal cost of self-preservation spending would be increasing, rather than a constant. There would still
be a threshold analogous to A0 for autocracy, and for higher values of A there would still be a unique interior
optimal amount of self-preservation spending, increasing in A. A sucient condition for self-preservation
spending beyond A0 to still be concave would be that the supply curve for foreign loans is convex, which is
very likely to be the empirically relevant case.
3 Evidence
3.1 General strategy
The main result of the paper is a highly non-linear relationship between resource income A and self-
preservation eorts B, as depicted in Figure 1. In principle, there are three possible approaches to try to
identify this relationship empirically. We discuss the three approaches and explain why only one, which we
discuss last, is likely to generate compelling evidence. In discussing the three approaches we assume we have
good measures of A and B. In the next section we discuss the data in detail.
Given a measure of B the rst plan that comes to mind (Plan A) is to try to get a measure of A and
then use non-linear methods to directly estimate the function in Figure 1 using cross-country data in levels.
There are at least two problems with this approach. First, is the well-rehearsed vulnerability of cross-country
relationships to omitted variable bias. There may be plenty of hard-to-account-for factors correlated both
with the volume of resource rents and the political system. Second, as discussed at the end of the previous
section the autocracy threshold A0 is likely to be country specic. Appropriate identication would therefore
require explicitly modelling the dependence of A0 on hard-to-measure country specic factors. The results
would likely be fairly untransparent and inconclusive.
Plan B investigates the relationship between A and B within countries, or, equivalently, in dierences,
conditioning on the initial level of A. Looking at the eects of changes in A on changes in B eliminates
time-invariant confounding country-specic factors that bias inference in levels. Country xed eects can
be added to control for country-specic trends in democracy/autocracy and time eects can be added to
control for global trends. Hence, plans B largely sidesteps the rst of the identication issues aecting Plan
A. However, because it conditions on the initial level of A, Plan B still requires an estimate of country-specic
autocracy thresholds A0, so it is still unsatisfactory.
Plan C, like plan B, estimates the relationship in dierences, but instead of conditioning on the initial
level of A it conditions on the initial level of B. Our theoretical results say that countries to the left of the
autocracy threshold are democracies so we can infer that if a country is a democracy it is to the left of its
A0. We therefore expect no eect of changes in A on changes in B in democracies. We also know from
the model that countries to the right of A0 are autocracies, and the further to the left they are the more
autocratic they are. Hence, we can infer that autocracies are to the right of A0, and the more autocratic
they are the further to the right they are. We therefore expect that the eect of changes in A on changes in
B is positive in autocracies, the less so the more autocratic the initial position. This plan largely sidesteps
both the problem of omitted factors in levels and the country-specicity of the autocracy threshold.
113.2 Data
We construct a measure for B from the variable Polity2 in the Polity IV database [Marshall and Jaggers
(2005)]. Polity2 is widely used in the empirical political-science literature as a measure of the position of
a country on a continuum autocracy-democracy spectrum [e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared
(2008), Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2009); Besley and Kudamatsu (2008); Br uckner and Ciccone (2009)]. It
aggregates information on several building blocks, including political participation (existence of institutions
through which citizens can express preferences over policies and leaders), constraints on the executive, and
guarantees of civil liberties both in daily life and in political participation, as evaluated by Polity IV coders.
Polity2 varies continuously from -10 (extreme autocracy) to +10 (perfect democracy). Note, therefore,
that polity2 is an inverse measure of B.9 We follow the convention in the vast majority of the literature
that interprets negative values of polity2 as pertaining to autocracies and positive ones to democracies [e.g.
Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2009); Besley and Kudamatsu (2008); Br uckner and Ciccone (2009), Olken and
Jones (2009), Epstein et al. (2006)]. Nevertheless we discuss alternative thresholds in Section 3.4.
To map the Polity Score into a proxy for B we make the following assumption:
Polityit =    f(Bit) + "it; (2)
where Bit is our variable of interest, f is a monotonic function with f(0) = 0,  > 0 is a constant, and "it
is an i.i.d. error with zero mean. These assumptions imply that when the government does not attempt to
subvert in its favour the political process (B = 0) the polity measure tends to be positive and its variation
to depend on factors we do not model. Instead, when the government takes an autocratic stance, the polity
variable is decreasing in the aggressiveness of this stance.
As long as f(B) is not (too) convex, Assumption (2) implies that the polity score will inherit the same
properties of B in the model. In particular, for values of the polity score associated with democracies
(polity> 0, or B = 0) changes in A have no systematic eect on changes in polity score. In autocracies
(negative polity, or positive B) increases in A have negative but decreasing eects on changes in the polity
score.
To measure natural-resource windfalls at the country level we proceed as follows. First, for each country
and for each year that data is available we rank all commodities (in the universe of agricultural and mineral
commodities) by value of exports. We then identify each country's principal commodity as the commodity
that is ranked rst in the largest number of years. The export data by commodity, country, and year are
from the United Nation's Comtrade data set, which reports dollar values of exports according to the SITC1
system, for the period 1962 to 2009. Finally, we match each country's principal commodity with an annual
time series of that commodity's world price. All commodity prices are extracted from the IMF IFS dataset,
with the exception of Gemstones, Pig Iron and Bauxite, whose price series are obtained from the United
States Geological Survey.
9The Polity2 variable is a modication of the basic Polity variable, added in order to facilitate the use of the Polity in
time-series analysis. It converts \standardized authority scores"(-88, -77, -66) into conventional polity scores. In particular,
\foreign interruptions" (-66) are coded as missing variables, cases of \interregnum and anarchy" (-77) are coded as 0, and
\transitions" (-88) are prorated through the time span of the transition. We adjust Polity2 by assigning missing values to cases
of interregnum and anarchy, to avoid the misleading representation of autocracies progressing toward democracy in periods
of anarchy. In section 3.4 we investigate the robustness of our results to alternative adjustments of \standardized authority
scores."
12We identify a change in A in country i as a change in the price of country i's principal commodity.
As both the identity of a country's principal commodity and its price in international markets are largely
exogenous to the country's political outcomes we think this measure allows for clean identication of the
causal eects of resource windfalls (we investigate robustness to dropping the largest producers below).
We study changes over the period 1962-2009. Our baseline sample consists of 131 countries with in-
formation on both principal-commodity export shares and polity2 scores. There are 32 distinct principal
commodities in this sample. The most frequent are oil, which is the principal commodity in 30 countries
and coee (11 countries). Table 1 gives the list of these principal commodities and their distribution among
countries.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2. Polity is the one-year dierence in Polity2, while
AvgPrice is the average growth rate in the price of the principal commodity over a three-year window
(we discuss timing issues below). AvgShare is the average over time of the value of exports of a country's
principal commodity as a share in GDP. Countshare Princ indicates the number of years the principal com-
modity has been the principal export, while Countshare is the total number of years in which commodity
shares are available. Some of the notable features in the data are the huge variation in the polity2 score
(spanning the entire set of possibilities in all years) and the secular trend towards greater democracy. The
table also shows that principal commodities are ranked rst in almost all years in which resource shares are
available. Finally, the table shows that there is much variation in the measure of resource windfalls.
3.3 Results
Our main empirical results are presented in Table 3. The dependent variable is the one-year change in
Polity2. Recall that an increase in this variable means that the country becomes less autocratic (more demo-
cratic). In column 1 the explanatory variable is the lagged change in the price of the principal commodity,
averaged over the previous three years. Hence, if the change in Polity2 is measured between years t 1 and
t; the change in commodity prices is the average over the years t 4; t 3; t 2, and t 1. We look at lagged
changes in prices to defuse lingering concerns about reverse causation, as well as to allow for possible lags
in the reaction of political actors to economic events. We take averages of price changes over three periods
to reduce the role of extremely transitory shocks as well as measurement error in the explanatory variable.
By construction, however, the rolling windows introduce serial correlation in the estimates. To account for
this, we cluster the standard errors at the country level in all regressions, allowing for heteroskedasticity
and arbitrary correlation in the error term. We further report on robustness to timing assumptions below.
Country and time xed eects are included here, and in all subsequent specications.
Column 1 reports estimates for the average eect of resource windfalls, which is negative but not sta-
tistically signicant. Recall that in our theory the average eect is a weighted average of nil eects in
democracies and negative eects in autocracies, and thus depends on the relative frequency of autocratic
and democratic observations. In our sample the number of democracies substantially exceeds the number
of autocracies (2570 versus 2305 observations). It is therefore not surprising that the overall eect is not
statistically signicant.
In the remaining columns we test our more detailed predictions. Column 2 looks at the eect of price
changes in democracies and autocracies separately. This is accomplished by separating out the price-change
variables into two variables: the rst is an interaction between the price change and a dummy for autocracy
13(following the literature convention that identies autocracies as countries with a negative polity2 score);
the second is an interaction between price change and a dummy for democracy (non-negative polity2).10 To
be consistent with the starting date for the price shock implied by our lagging choices we measure the initial
level of autocracy democracy with a four year lag, or in year t 4. As predicted by the model, price changes
in the principal commodity have a negative impact on the polity2 score in autocracies, i.e. make autocracies
more autocratic. Instead, they have no signicant impact on the polity2 score in democracies.11
Our model not only has predictions for the average eect of resource windfalls in democracies and
autocracies, but also on the relative magnitude of the eect depending on the initial value of (resource
rents and hence) the measure of political contestability. In particular, the prediction is that in democracies
commodity-price changes will have no impact not only on average but also for any initial level of polity2.
Instead, in autocracies the magnitude of the eect should be increasing in contestability: small in very
aggressive autocracies, and larger as the autocracy takes milder forms. We test this prediction in Column 3,
where we add four-year lags of polity2 both, by themselves and interacted with the (autocracy/democracy
specic) price change, the latter being the variable of interest. The conditioning variable has been entered
with a lag to allow once again for potentially slow responses by political actors. As predicted, in democracies
commodity price changes have no impact at any level of initial polity2, while in autocracies the increase in
autocracy following a resource windfall is larger the higher the initial value of polity2, i.e. the less autocratic
the form of government was initially.
The results in Columns 1-3 are based on OLS estimation. In Column 4 we show that the results are
virtually unchanged using System-GMM estimation. System-GMM provides consistent estimates in dynamic
panel data model with xed eects, by instrumenting the dierenced variables that are not strictly exogenous
with all their available lags in levels and dierences. This removes the bias introduced in OLS estimates
by the within group transformation, which by construction produces a correlation between the transformed
lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term [Nickell (1981), Bond (2002)]. The system GMM
results in Column 4 are very close to the original OLS.
Our main results are illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the estimated eect of a change in the price of
the principal commodity on the change in polity2, conditional on the initial level of polity2, together with
90% condence bands. In the top panel, we have the average (unconditional) eect, which is negative but
insignicant. In the middle panel we have average eects in democracies and autocracies separately. The
eect is negative in autocracies and nil in democracies. In the bottom panel we plot the response conditional
on infra-marginal dierences in contestability. The increase in autocracies is more severe the milder the
initial level of autocracy.
The estimated coecients imply that the impact of resource windfalls for a weak autocracy (say, at
polity2 level -2) is more than twice as large as the one for a more consolidated autocracy at polity2 level -6.
In the weak autocracy, the long-run eect of resource windfalls implies that a 10% increase in the price of the
principal commodity reduces the Polity2 score by 1.65 points, or 8% of the domain of Polity2 (which goes
from -10 to +10). For the more consolidated autocracy, instead, the eect of a 10% increase in the price of
the principal commodity only reduces the Polity2 score by 0.8 points. An alternative way to put this is that
10It can be easily checked that this is equivalent to including the price change by itself and then an interaction between
the price change and, say, a democracy dummy. Our specication makes the interpretation of the coecients even more
straightforward.
11In Column 2 and elsewhere in the table the coecients on the level of initial contestability is negative in democracies, and
insignicant in autocracies. This suggests that there is some convergence among democracies but not among autocracies.
14a weak autocracy like Ecuador (average Polity2 score in autocracy -2) needs a 24% price shock to move to
a more consolidated form of autocracy, like Nigeria's (average Polity2 score in autocracy -6). For Nigeria to
experience a similar 4 points reduction in the Polity2 scale, and become like Saudi Arabia (average Polity2
score in autocracy -10), the price increase in the principal commodity should be of 50%.
3.4 Robustness checks
In this section we report a number of robustness checks on our results from the previous subsection. In
particular, we discuss robustness to: alternative criteria for inclusion in the sample based on (i) importance
of the principal commodity in the economy and (ii) accuracy of the identication of the principal commodity;
(iii) focusing on observations away from the lower and upper bounds of polity2; (iv) dropping large commodity
producers with the potential of inuencing the world price; (v) measuring resource-rent shocks based on a
basket of commodities rather than only the principal commodity; (vi) breaking down commodities by type
(mineral v. non-mineral; point-source v. diuse); (vii) alternative ways to treat problematic values of polity2;
(viii) alternative measures of the outcome variable; (ix) alternative timing structures for the relationship
between outcomes and shocks; and (x) alternative thresholds for democracy.
Table 4 checks the robustness of our results to the exclusion of countries whose principal commodity
accounts for only a small share of GDP. For these countries it is unlikely that a price change represents
a large windfall, so focusing on a smaller sample with signicant principal-commodity share is arguably
a better test for our model.12 Columns 1 to 3 exclude countries in the rst decile of the average share
distribution (14 countries, typically modern democracies with a diversied economy); columns 4 to 6 exclude
countries in the rst quartile (38 countries); and columns 7 to 9 exclude all countries below the median
average share (68 countries). Results from baseline sample are conrmed and generally reinforced as we
progressively increase the threshold to be included in the sample. In particular the point estimates for the
average eect in autocracy (columns 2, 4 and 6) become more negative as we focus on more commodity
dependent countries. Also the lagged level of polity2 interacted with the (autocracy specic) price change
remains negative and signicant throughout all subsamples, conrming the heterogeneous impact of resource
windfalls within autocracies.
In Table 5 we show results are robust to the possible sample selection induced by data availability. As
some countries only report few years of export data, their principal commodity may be poorly identied.
We address this concern in a number of ways. First, we rank countries by number of years on which it was
possible to identify the principal commodity. We then drop the 25% with fewest years (which turn out to be
countries with at most sixteen years of export-share data). The results are in Columns 1 to 3. Columns 4
to 6 restrict the sample to countries for which we observe export data for the principal commodity at least
once before 1986, which is the mid-point of the sample period. In columns 7 to 9 we also include those
countries that do not have share data before 1986, but whose principal commodity has always been ranked
rst afterwards. In this case it is plausible to assume that the commodity had been important before 1986,
even though there is lack of data to conrm it. Our results are robust to all these checks.
Table 6 investigates the robustness of our result on the heterogeneous impact of resource windfalls within
12However this benet should be weighed against the fact that the size of the commodity sector is endogenous. Hence this
exercise reintroduces through the back door of sample selection the endogeneity issues we sought to avoid by focusing on price
changes. This is why the exercise is a robustness check. Our prefereed approach remains the one in the previous section.
15autocracies. One potential concern is that such heterogeneity might be driven by the boundedness of the
polity scale. The argument is that observations at the -10 boundary are more constrained in their movements
than non-boundary observations. In particular, as they can't go lower than -10, price increases would not
result in institutional changes. We address this concern in a number of ways. In column 1 we restrict the
sample to non-negative polity2 changes, so that countries at the -10 boundary are unconstrained in their
movements. We still nd a negative and highly signicant heterogeneous eect among autocracies. In column
2 we perform a similar exercise, but replace the polity2 change by a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if we observe a positive change and 0 otherwise. This weighs all institutional changes equally. The
heterogeneous impact of price variation is also maintained under this specication. Column 3 restricts the
sample to all countries that never touched the [-10, +10] boundaries. This is the sample of countries that
had eective free movements in both positive and negative directions. Also in this case, we nd a negative
and signicant eect among autocracies. Finally in column 4 we exclude all country-year observations at
the [-10, 10] boundaries. Limiting the sample to the unbounded cases provides consistent estimates for
censored regressors [Rigobon and Stoker (2007, 2009)]. The results again conrm the heterogeneity among
autocracies.
In a further eort to probe the role of observations at the -10 boundary, we estimate the heterogenous
eect of price changes non parametrically. We divide all observations into six bins, depending on the value
of polity2, and re-estimate the relationship between changes in polity2 and changes in principal-commodity
prices separately for each of these bins (always including country and year xed eects). The six bins are
for polity2 values [-10,-8], [-7,-6], [-5,0], [1,5], [6,7], and [8,10], respectively. These bin sizes were chosen to
have as uniform as possible a sample size across bins, while at the same time preserving symmetry between
\autocratic" and \democratic" bins. The estimated coecients and the relative condence bands (at the
90% level) are plotted against the average value of polity2 in each bin in Figure 3. The gure shows that
even in the second bin from the bottom, the eect of price changes is considerably weaker than in the third
bin. This is important because for observations in this bin the upper bound at -10 does not appear ever to
be binding. To check this, we have calculated, for each initial value of the polity2 variable on the right hand
side of our main regression, the fraction of (strictly) negative policy changes equal to the distance from the
lower bound, on the left hand side. For example, for observations at polity2=-7, we computed the fraction
of negative changes equal to -3. The results, reported in Appendix Table 1 (together with the analogous
numbers for positive changes), show that the lower bound at -10 is never binding for changes in any of the
ve bins other than the bottom bin.13
In Table 7 we address the plausible concern that current commodity prices are aected by expectations
of future political developments in the main world producers. We therefore exclude from the sample all
countries belonging to OPEC (columns 1 and 2) and those accounting for more than 3% of total world
production of their principal commodity (columns 3 and 4).14 Despite the signicant drop in sample size, in
our key specications the results on the heterogeneous impact among autocracies remain robust at least at
13It may seem strange that there are strictly negative changes at initial polity2 equal to -10, but remember that the initial
value is observed with a four year lag. It is thus possible for a country that was at -10 4 years before to have since moved to a
level strictly less than -10 and then have a regression between year t-1 and t.
14We treat Indonesia and Gabon as OPEC countries, as they belonged to the organization for more than half of the sample
period. Instead, we exclude Angola and Ecuador, who joined the OPEC only in 2007. Alternative treatments of these countries
do not alter the results. A list of the major producers by prinicpal commodity , as well as data sources for commodity production,
is given in Appendix Table 2.
16the 10% signicance level.
Our source of identication for resource windfalls stems from variations in the international price of the
principal commodity. Other authors in this eld [Deaton (1999), Ciccone and Br uckner (2010), Besley and
Persson (2010)] use instead a country-specic composite price index, weighting commodity prices by the each
commodity's share in the country's total exports. We have not followed this strategy because of concerns
with the possible endogeneity of commodity shares (as well as measurement error). However in Table 8
we check the robustness of our results to this alternative specication, constructing a country-specic index
based on commodities in our sample. In column one we weigh price changes by each country's time average
of the share of that commodity in exports. Because time coverage of the share data varies dramatically over
time, these averages are also computed over very dierent time periods from country to country. In the other
columns we follow the far superior practice of using shares in a given year. The downside of this is that
sample sizes shrink signicantly as in each year there is a sizable subset of countries for which shares are not
observed. In these experiments, the qualitative patterns of our baseline results are robust, but statistical
signicance is not always achieved.
In Table 9 we deal with the issue of commodity typology. An important distinction that has been made
in the literature is between point source and diuse natural commodities [Sokolo and Engerman (2000),
Isham et al. (2005)]. The former are believed to foster weaker institutional capacity and induce greater
resistance to democratic reforms than the latter, as they are generally more valuable and easier to control
for the ruling elite. We therefore expect our theory to apply more strictly to point source countries. We
take as point source all mineral commodities plus coee, cocoa, sugar and bananas [agricultural commodities
identied as point source in Sokolo and Engerman (2000), Isham et al. (2005)]. Our data show that
point source producers are indeed more autocratic (average polity2 level -0.81) than countries with diuse
principal commodities (average polity2 level 3.13). A mean comparison test rejects the null hypothesis of
means equality at the 99% condence level (t-stat 17.4). Column 2 in Table 9 conrms our baseline results for
the sample of point source producers: the impact of resource windfalls is negative and heterogeneous within
autocracies, while it has no eect in democracies. Column 4 shows instead an average signicant eect for
diuse commodity producers, but no signicant heterogeneity. In columns 5 to 8 we consider an alternative
classication, taking as point source commodities minerals only. Column 6 conrms the results for mineral
autocratic countries. Column 8 considers non mineral countries only and displays a negative average relation
between price and institutional change, with no evidence of heterogeneity in the eect. Altogether, Table 9
provides support for our theory in point source producers under both alternative classications, while it is
less conclusive for diuse commodities producers.
As reported in section 3.2, the polity2 variable codes foreign interruptions as missing variables, cases of
interregnum and anarchy with a \neutral"score of 0, while transitions are prorated through the time span
of the transition. There exists a general agreement in recent literature on the miscoding of interregnum
and anarchy, as the 0 score often produces the wrong representation of autocracies progressing toward
democracy in periods of anarchy [Br uckner and Ciccone (2010), Burke and Leigh (2010), Plumper and
Neumayer (2010)]. The adopted solution consists in assigning missing values to interregnum and anarchy
periods. We have applied the same methodology in this paper. In Table 10 we set all observations pertaining
to transition periods to missing and we still get (in Column 3) a signicantly heterogeneous eect among
autocracies.
17One set of robustness checks that did not prove consistent with our baseline results was the use of alterna-
tive proxies for our variable B, which in our model represents the self-preservation activities of incumbents.
We tried two alternative measures of political repression: the Political Terror Scale (Wood and Gibney, 2010),
and the CIRI index of human rights (Cingranelli and Richards, 2008).15 PTS uses data from Amnesty Inter-
national and the US State Department. It gives a classication 1-5 from lowest to highest human insecurity
and provides a single score into which multiple dimension of abuse have been collapsed. The CIRI index
explicitly codes four dierent types of abuses: disappearances; political torture; imprisonment of political
opponents; killing of political opponents. It then constructs a nine point scale of \physical integrity"based
on the sum of these components. Neither of these measures turned out to be signicantly related to resource
windfalls in our sample. One relevant concern with such measures of repression however is that they only
capture outcomes. As has been noted by other authors as well, the PTS (but the same can be said of the
CIRI Index) \measures actual violations of physical integrity rights more than it measures general political
repression. In fact there will be instances in which one government is so repressive that, as a consequence,
there are relatively few acts of political violence" (Wood and Gibney, 2010, p. 370). This is to say, most
repressive countries can score low values of human rights violations as the high expected punishment deters
any actions that could trigger overtly repressive acts. This represents a main dierence with respect to the
polity2 variable, which attempts to capture not only outcomes but also procedural rules. In addition, polity2
aims to include a broader set of dimensions along which political activity can be distorted, beyond physical
repression. These observations are corroborated by the low correlation between the polity2 scores and the
PTS and CIRI scores (0.36 and 0.37, respectively).
Throughout our empirical analysis the main explanatory variable is the lagged change in the price of the
principal commodity, averaged over the previous three years. This means that institutional changes between
1979-1980 are explained by average price changes in 1977-1979; institutional changes between 1980-1981
are explained by average price changes in 1978-1980, and so on. The rolling window specication has the
clear advantage of smoothing out extreme observations and reducing measurement error, and the resulting
serial correlation in the estimates can be dealt with by clustering the standard errors at the country level,
allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation in the error term, as we have done. To further check
the robustness of our results to the timing structure, Table 11 presents estimates using three years non-
overlapping windows. This reduces the sample size by two thirds, which in turn increases standard errors.
Yet, we still nd some evidence consistent with our baseline specication. In particular, in column 3 the
key interaction term between initial political institutions and price changes still takes a negative (and 10%
signicant) coecient. We have also tried a dierent exercise related to the timing structure, maintaining
the overlapping nature of our explanatory variable but changing the time horizon. We have thus estimated
the eect of ve and ten years rolling windows on institutional changes between t   1and t. In the case
of the ve years window, the coecients have the same signs, but are not statistically signicant; in the
case of the ten years widow, the eect is negative and signicant for the average autocracy but displays no
heterogeneity.
While a large majority of authors have interpreted positive values of polity2 as pertaining to democracy,
one can nd in the literature examples of authors who have used a more stringent criterion. Thus in Table 12
15Another plausible candidate is the variable \purges"from the Banks database, which unfortunately is not available free of
charge.
18we present results using alternative thresholds. Our results are statistically robust when using thresholds of 1
and 2. For more demanding denitions of democracy the results are qualitatively robust, but lose statistical
signicance. A nal robustness check we performed was on the sensitivity of our results to possible outliers.
We re-run our specications excluding all the observations in the top 1% of the distribution of price changes
(in absolute value) and/or in the top 1% of the distribution of polity2 changes. We also excluded all inuential
observations, as identied by the DFBETA method, once again without changes in results. These results
are available on request.
4 Conclusions
We have presented a model of endogenous political-regime determination as a function of natural-resource
rents. The model predicts that, everything else equal, resource poor countries will be more likely to be
democracies that resource rich ones. This is a notoriously dicult prediction to test. Hence, we use the
model to develop an additional testable implication that, we argue, better leads itself to causal identication.
This prediction is that, among autocracies, resource windfalls will trigger further moves towards harsher forms
of autocracy, the more so the less entrenched the autocracy was initially, while there is no impact in countries
that start out as democracies. These predictions nd empirical support in a broad panel of countries.
Future work could usefully look at other outcomes. We have briey discussed in the text the possibility
of extending the model to deliver predictions on uses of the resource rents other than to distort the political
rules of the game in the incumbent's favor, such as spending on education or infrastructure. This could be
further extended to generate predictions on the growth response of the economy to resource windfalls. It
seems likely that such extensions will produce similar nonmonotonicities in the relation between resource
windfalls and outcomes as we found in this paper, and that such predictions could be tested using a similar
conditioning strategy.
The nonmonotonicites we uncover, both theoretically and empirically, imply a more nuanced policy
response to natural-resource windfalls than has generelly been the case heretofore. While our empirical work
focuses on \local" changes in resource rents, the model predicts that a large discrete resource windfall has
the capacity to tip a democracy into autocracy. Countries close to the democracy-autocracy threshold are
therefore more vulnerable to the impact of large resource discoveries, and should be the focus of heightened
attention from policy makers in importing countires and extractive industiers alike.
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225 Appendix: Formal Analysis of the Model
5.1 Equilibria where the challenger always challenges
5.1.1 Optimal choice of B subject to challenger challenging





e B)V (A;B0) + A +    B;








Since V (A;B0) > 0 B(A;B0) exists for every A.
The equilibrium value of B must satisfy
B = 0 if B(A;0) < 0
B = B(A;B) if 0  B(A;B)  A
B = A if B(A;A) > A
Begin by computing B(A;0). Since
V (A;0) =
A + 










Hence B(A;0) < 0 if the expression on the right hand is greater than 1. This can be rearranged to
A <






By PA1 in the text A0 > 0.
Next we compute B(A;B):Since
V (A;B) =
A +    B

























The right side is monotonically increasing, ranging from 0 to innity. The left side is monotonically
23decreasing, ranging from positive to negative innity. Hence B always exists. The intercept of the left side
on the vertical axis is grater than1 if A > A0. Hence the condition B > 0 is satised for A > A0.
Dene B(A) the solution to the xed point problem we have just examined. We have B(A0) = 0 (as
the intercept of the right side of the expression above is 1). Using the implicit function theorem we also nd
B0(A) =
1




(A +    B(A))2;
so B(A) is increasing and concave. Plugging in the expression for A0 in B0(A); and recalling that B(A0) =
0 one can check that B0(A0) < 1. This implies that the B(A) function never crosses the 45-degree line, so
the condition B(A;A) > A is never satised.
5.1.2 Optimality of decision to challenge
We have established that in this MPE (if it exists) the incumbent plays
B = 0 if A  A0
B = B(A) if A0 < A:
Subject to the game continuing as one where challengers challenge, the challenger of a generic period chal-
lenges if
p(B)V (A;B) > :
Since V (A;B) is increasing in A (after taking into account the dependence of B on A, and using the








5.1.3 Absence of protable deviations for incumbent
The last thing to check is that a generic incumbent cannot or does not wish to implement a one-period
deviation that deters the current challenger from challenging. Call the deviation ~ Bc(A). This is given by

e  ~ Bc




























The deviation dominates if
A +    ~ Bc + 
A +    B
1    [1   
e B]
>
A +    B
1    [1   
e B]




A +    B
1   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>
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(   1)[A +    B]
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which is the opposite of PA3. Hence PA3 insures the existence of a MPE where the challenger always
challenges. (Note that the deviation described above may be unfeasible for certain values of A in which case
a fortiori the existence of the challenging equilibrium is conrmed.)
5.2 Equilibria where the challenger never challenges
Dene ~ V (A;B) the value of incumbency in a MPE where the challenger never challenges and all incum-
bents play B:
~ V (A;B) =
A +    B
1   
The condition that assures that the challenger does not challenge is

e B A +    B
1   
 :
For reasons already seen above there exists a unique solution to the equation

e B A +    B
1   
= :
We call this solution ~ B(A). Note that ~ B(A) is strictly increasing.





which is trues in view of PA2..
It is obvious that any B > ~ B cannot be an equilibrium. Any incumbent would deviate to a lower level
25of B. Obviously for ~ B to be an equilibrium it must be feasible, or
~ B(A)  A:
Since ~ B(0) > 0, there exists an interval of values for A such that an equilibrium where the challenger does
not challenge does not exist.
Now rewrite the denition of ~ B as























Because ~ B(A) is concave and ~ B(0) > 0, there exists a ~ A > 0 such that ~ B(A) < A for A > ~ A. ~ A is dened by














The key condition that must be satised by an equilibrium with no challenges is that the incumbent does
not wish to deviate to a lower B. A generic deviation B is dominated if
A +    B + (1   
e B)
A +    ~ B
1   
<
A +    ~ B
1   
:
The left side is maximized by B
c(A; ~ B), which, after rearranging the rst order condition is given by
B




V (A; ~ B):
26Plugging this back into the left side of the inequality above we have








V (A; ~ B)
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V (A; ~ B) + 1
i
> e ~ B
Now recall that
e ~ B(A) =

V (A; ~ B(A))

















log() + 1 + log









V (A; ~ B)
i
exp[log() + 1] > exp[log(1=)]
exp[log() + 1]expf [log(1=)]g > 1
exp[log() + 1   log(1=)] > 1
exp[log() + 1 + log()] > 1
exp[log() + 1] > 1
log() + 1 > 0;
which once again is the opposite of PA3 so PA3 rules out equilibria where the challenger never challenges.
27Figure 1. Theoretical relation between resource revenues and autocracy
28Figure 2. Marginal price eect at dierent levels of initial Polity
All graphs plot estimates from Table 3. The upper graph plots the estimates in column (1) for the average
eect of price changes on Polity2 changes. The central graph plots the estimates in column (2) where the
eect of price changes is conditional on the country being an autocracy or a democracy. The lower graph
plots the estimates in column (3), which condition on the exact Polity2 level the country is at the start of
the price variation.
29Figure 3. Estimated coecients at dierent bins
The graph divides the Polity scale into six bins. The bins are constructed so to maintain the symmetry
around the zero threshold, while minimizing the dierences in frequency across them. For each bin the
estimated coecient of Polity2 change on price change and the relative 90% condence intervals are
plotted.
30Table 1. Countries, by Commodity
Princ. Comm. Countries Countries
Oil 30 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, China, Norway, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon
Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lybia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trinindad, Tunisia, UAE, UK, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen
Coee 11 Brazil Burundi, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Madagascar
Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda
Wood 9 Austria, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Sweden
Pig Iron 8 Albania, Bhutan, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Japan, Lebanon, Slovakia, Ukraine
Gemstones 7 Armenia, Botswana, Central African Republic, India, Lesotho, Namibia, Sierra Leone
Oranges 6 Cyprus, Israel, Italy, Moldova, Spain, Turkey
Aluminum 6 Bahrain, Germany, Ghana, Mozambique, Slovenia, Switzerland
Cotton 5 Benin, Burkina Faso, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Sudan
Bananas 4 Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Philippines
Beef 4 Djibouti, Ireland, New Zealand, Uruguay
Copper 4 Chile, Mongolia, Peru, Zambia
Fish 4 Bangladesh, South Korea, Malta, Tanzania
Phosphates 4 Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, Togo
Coal 3 Australia, Czech Republic, Poland
Tobacco 3 Greece, Malawi, Zimbabwe
Bauxite 2 Guinea, Jamaica
Natural gas 2 Belgium, Turkmenistan
Rice 2 Pakistan, Thailand
Swine 2 Denmark, Netherlands
Tea 2 Kenya, Sri Lanka
Wheat 2 Argentina, France
Cocoa 1 Cote d'Ivoire
Gold 1 Papua New Guinea
Groundnuts 1 Gambia
Jute 1 Nepal
Maize 1 United States
Rubber 1 Cambodia





31Table 2. Summary Statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
AvgPrice .078 .19 -.36 1.04 5486
Polity .09 1.72 -18 16 5380
Polity2 .99 7.56 -10 10 5528
Polity2 1962 -.11 7.60 -10 10 4464
Polity2 2009 4.16 6.05 -10 10 6276
AvgShare .067 .09 .001 .41 6276
Countshare Princ 22.12 11.85 2 48 6276
Countshare 30.86 15.03 2 48 6276
32Table 3. Baseline Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LS LS LS SYS-GMM
Pr -0.253
(0.17)
Pra -0.326* -0.418** -0.717***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.22)
Prd 0.114 0.117 0.051
(0.19) (0.18) (0.26)
Pra  Plt 4;a -0.137** -0.139*
(0.06) (0.08)






State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of countries 131 131 131 131
Observations 4875 4744 4744 4744
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is
the t 1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). The method of estimation in columns
(1)-(3) is least squares, in column (4) system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). The values in brackets
are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
33Table 4. Export Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Above 1st Decile Share Above 1st Quartile Share Above Median Share
Pra -0.268 -0.374* -0.278 -0.407* -0.407 -0.494*
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.26) (0.26)
Prd 0.289 0.271 0.350 0.328 0.435 0.402
(0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.31) (0.31)
Pra  Plt 4;a -0.135** -0.162*** -0.112**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Prd  Plt 4;d 0.023 0.058 -0.048
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Plt 4;a -0.078*** -0.074*** -0.060**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Plt 4;d -0.125*** -0.138*** -0.071*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of countries 117 117 93 93 63 63
Observations 4206 4206 3413 3413 2312 2312
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is the t   1
to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). The values in brackets are Huber robust standard
errors clustered at the country level. Columns (1)-(2) exclude countries in the rst decile of average
share for the principal commodity. Columns (3)-(4) exclude countries in the rst quartile of average
share for the principal commodity. Columns (5)-(6) exclude countries below the median of average
share for the principal commodity.
34Table 5. Shares Availability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Above 1st Quartile Obs. Observations before 1986 Always 1st after 1986
Pra -0.360* -0.500** -0.393** -0.515** -0.321* -0.428**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19)
Prd 0.214 0.203 0.134 0.132 0.116 0.124
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
Pra  Plt 4;a -0.163** -0.158** -0.142**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Prd  Plt 4;d 0.007 0.037 0.036
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Plt 4;a -0.070** -0.071*** -0.070***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Plt 4;d -0.105*** -0.116*** -0.113***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of countries 96 96 92 92 105 105
Observations 3795 3795 3724 3724 4072 4072
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is the t 1 to
t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors
clustered at the country level. Columns (1)-(2) exclude countries in the rst quartile of observations
on which the principal commodity is identied. Columns (3)-(4) exclude countries that don't have
observations for share before 1986, the midpoint year of share observations. Columns (5)-(6) include
countries that don't have observations for share before 1986, but whose principal commodity has always
been ranked rst afterwards.
35Table 6. Boundary Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pl  0 D=1jPl  0 Unbounded Countries Unbounded Obs.
Pra -0.448** -0.052 -0.391* -0.413*
(0.17) (0.03) (0.23) (0.21)
Prd -0.021 -0.009 0.075 0.106
(0.12) (0.03) (0.29) (0.26)
Pra  Plt 4;a -0.158*** -0.028** -0.134* -0.139*
(0.05) (0.01) (0.08) (0.07)
Prd  Plt 4;d 0.032 0.012 0.076 0.032
(0.04) (0.01) 0.076 (0.11)
Plt 4;a -0.013 -0.004 -0.080*** -0.076***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Plt 4;d -0.075*** -0.013*** -0.150*** -0.133***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of countries 131 131 90 107
Observations 4592 4744 3222 3634
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is the t   1 to t change in the
revised Polity score (Polity2). The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
Column (1) considers non-negative Polity2 changes only. Column (2) estimates a dummy variable which takes value of
1 if there is a positive Polity2 change, and 0 otherwise. Column (3) restricts the sample to countries that never touched
the boundaries at -10 and +10 on the Polity scale. Column (4) excludes the observations at -10 and +10.
36Table 7. Big Producers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exclude OPEC countries Exclude Big Producers
Pra -0.361 -0.433** -0.428* -0.536**
(0.22) (0.21) (0.26) (0.24)
Prd 0.087 0.092 -0.016 -0.049
(0.20) (0.19) (0.26) (0.25)
Pra  Plt 4;a -0.147** -0.153*
(0.07) (0.08)






State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of countries 120 120 87 87
Observations 4282 4282 3003 3003
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable
is the t   1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). The values in brackets are
Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Columns (1)-(2) exclude OPEC
countries. Columns (3)-(4) exclude countries producing more than 3% of total world pro-
duction in their principal commodity. Detail on the sources used to identify big producers
are reported in Table 7b.
37Table 8. Alternative Denitions Price Index.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average 1975 1980 1990 2001
Indexa -0.461 -0.491* -0.461 -0.515* -0.518*
(0.33) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.28)
Indexd 0.176 0.318 0.299 0.104 0.304
(0.35) (0.38) (0.22) (0.37) (0.33)
Indexa  Plt 4;a -0.097 -0.118 -0.157* -0.220** -0.111
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08)
Indexd  Plt 4;d 0.071 0.117 -0.007 0.011 0.083
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08)
Plt 4;a -0.067*** -0.074** -0.064** -0.025 -0.072***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Plt 4;d -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.064 -0.055 -0.096***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)) (0.04) (0.03)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4957 3600 3527 3327 4629
Countries 131 84 82 78 122
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is the t   1 to t change
in the revised Polity score (Polity2). The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the
country level. All columns follow the methodology in Deaton and Miller (1995) to construct the weighted price
index of commodities. We use all commodities included in the UN COMTRADE database and whose price series
is identied in the IMF IFS database. Columns (1) weights commodities by their average share in country exports,
measured over all available years. Column (2) weights commodities by their share in 1975, the base year used in
Deaton-Miller (1995). Column (3) weights commodities by their share in 1980, the base year used in Besley-Persson
(2008). Column (4) weights commodities by their share in 1990, the base year used in Deaton (1999) and Br uckner
and Ciccone (2010). Column (5) weights commodities by their share in 2001, the year with the highest number of
reporting countries.
38Table 9. Typologies of Commodities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Point Source Diuse Mineral Non Mineral
Pra -0.273 -0.372* -1.583* -1.633* -0.141 -0.222 -1.062** -1.069***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.82) (0.82) (0.29) (0.29) (0.41) (0.40)
Prd 0.250 0.237 -0.511 -0.436 0.236 0.224 -0.225 -0.239
(0.22) (0.22) (0.46) (0.44) (0.28) (0.27) (0.36) (0.33)
Pra  Plt 4;a -0.177*** 0.331 -0.119** -0.037
(0.05) (0.57) (0.05) (0.21)
Prd  Plt 4;d 0.021 0.138 0.064 -0.008
(0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.13)
Plt 4;a -0.051** -0.116 -0.079** -0.053
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05)
Plt 4;d -0.111*** -0.126*** -0.123*** -0.109***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of countries 87 87 44 44 70 70 61 61
Observations 3127 3127 1617 1617 2494 2494 2250 2250
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is the t   1 to t change in the
revised Polity score (Polity2). The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
Mineral commodities are: Aluminum, Bauxite, Coal, Copper, Gemstones, Gold, Natural Gas, Oil, Pig Iron, Phosphates,
Silver, Tin, Uranium. Non-mineral commodities are: Bananas, Beef Meat, Cocoa, Coee, Cotton, Fish, Groundnuts,
Jute, Maize, Oranges, Rice, Rubber, Soybean, Sugar, Swine Meat, Tea, Tobacco, Wheat, Wood. The point source/diuse
distinction follows almost the same classication, but assign countries producing Bananas, Cocoa, Coee and Sugar to
the other category.








Pra  Plt 4;a -0.123**
(0.06)






State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N. of countries 131 131 131
Observations 4751 4555 4555
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent
variable is the t   1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). The values in
brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Columns
(1) to (3) consider the baseline sample of 131 countries and replace transition years
(Polity=-77) by missing values.








Pra  Plt 4;a -0.078*
(0.05)






State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1621 1599 1599
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent
variable is the t   3 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). The values
in brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country level. The
estimation is for three-years non-overlapping periods: the change in Polity2 in period
1963-1966 is explained by the change in price in period 1962-1965; the change in
Polity2 in period 1966-1969 is explained by the change in price in period 1965-1968;
and similarly for following periods.
41Table 12. Alternative Thresholds for Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Polity  1 Polity  2 Polity  3 Polity  4 Polity  5
Pra -0.353* -0.484*** -0.360* -0.458** -0.362* -0.408** -0.308* -0.296* -0.363* -0.289
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
Prd 0.198 0.175 0.176 0.160 0.147 0.149 0.094 0.112 0.071 0.131
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Pra  Plt 4;a -0.164*** -0.125** -0.080 -0.012 -0.004
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Prd  Plt 4;d -0.038 -0.024 -0.007 0.057 0.065
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.15)
Plt 4;a -0.62*** -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.082***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Plt 4;d -0.109*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.087** -0.114***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4744 4744 4744 4744 4744 4744 4744 4744 4744 4744
;
 ;
 represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is the t   1 to t change in
the revised Polity score (Polity2). The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country
level.
42Appendix Table A1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Plt 4 #Pl  0 #(Pl =  10jPl  0) % to Pl=-10 #Pl  0 #(Pl = 10jPl  0) % to Pl=10
-10 4 1 0.25 9 0 0
-9 5 2 0.4 40 0 0
-8 5 2 0.4 18 0 0
-7 16 0 0 76 0 0
-6 8 0 0 29 0 0
-5 6 0 0 17 0 0
-4 5 0 0 10 0 0
-3 7 0 0 7 0 0
-2 2 0 0 9 0 0
-1 7 0 0 13 0 0
0 4 0 0 3 0 0
1 4 0 0 5 0 0
2 3 0 0 6 0 0
3 4 0 0 6 0 0
4 5 0 0 5 0 0
5 10 0 0 13 0 0
6 12 0 0 20 0 0
7 16 0 0 17 1 0.059
8 19 0 0 17 1 0.059
9 13 0 0 15 9 0.6
10 5 0 0 1 0 0
Column (1) reports the number of negative changes in the Polity2 score at each initial level of Polity2 at t-4. Column (2) reports the
number of negative changes that bring the Polity2 score at -10. Column (3) calculates the percentage. Column (4) reports the number
of positive changes in the Polity2 score at each initial level of Polity2 at t-4. Column (5) reports the number of positive changes that
bring the Polity2 score at 10. Column (6) calculates the percentage.
43Appendix Table A2. Big Producers, by Commodity
Commodity Countries
Oil Algeria, Angola, China, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Lybia, Mexico
Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Venezuela
Coee Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, Guatemala
Wood Canada, Finland, Sweden
Tea Kenya, Sri Lanka
Bananas Costa Rica, Philippines
Oranges Italy, Spain














Data for commodities produced in a country that constitute more than 3% of total world supply
are obtained from the following sources: Copper, Gold, Bauxite, Tin, Phosphates, Uranium, Gem-
stones (British Geological Survey 2000-2008, available here); Cocoa, Bananas, Oranges, Beef, Jute,
Maize, Wood, Rice, Sugar, Tea, Tobacco (Food and Agricultural Organization 1970-2009, available
here); Coee (International Coee Organization 1980-2009, available here); Cotton (US Department of
Agriculture 1970-2009, available here); Coal, Oil (US Energy Information Administration 1980-2009,
available here).
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